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Abstract European animal disease policy seems to find its justification in a ‘‘harm
to other’’ principle. Limiting the freedom of animal keepers—e.g., by culling their
animals—is justified by the aim to prevent harm, i.e., the spreading of the disease.
The picture, however, is more complicated. Both during the control of outbreaks
and in the prevention of notifiable, animal diseases the government is confronted
with conflicting claims of stakeholders who anticipate running a risk to be harmed
by each other, and who ask for government intervention. In this paper, we first argue
that in a policy that aims to prevent animal diseases, the focus shifts from limiting
‘‘harm’’ to weighing conflicting claims with respect to ‘‘risks of harm.’’ Therefore,
we claim that the harm principle is no longer a sufficient justification for govern-
mental intervention in animal disease prevention. A policy that has to deal with and
distribute conflicting risks of harm needs additional value assumptions that guide
this process of assessment and distribution. We show that currently, policies are
based on assumptions that are mainly economic considerations. In order to show the
limitations of these considerations, we use the interests and position of keepers of
backyard animals as an example. Based on the problems they faced during and after
the recent outbreaks, we defend the thesis that in order to develop a sustainable
animal disease policy other than economic assumptions need to be taken into
account.
F. L. B. Meijboom (&)  F. W. A. Brom
Animal Breeding and Genomics Centre, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands
e-mail: F.L.B.Meijboom@uu.nl
N. Cohen  E. N. Stassen
Animals and Society, Animal Production Systems Group, WIAS, Wageningen University,
Wageningen, The Netherlands
F. L. B. Meijboom
Ethics Institute, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 8, NL-3584 Utrecht, The Netherlands
123
J Agric Environ Ethics (2009) 22:559–571
DOI 10.1007/s10806-009-9177-2
Keywords Animal disease control  Harm principle 
Keepers of backyard animals  Risk  Moral values
Introduction
As in many parts of Europe, The Netherlands have been confronted with several
outbreaks of notifiable animal diseases1: classical swine fever in 1997–1998, foot
and mouth disease in 2001, and avian influenza (bird flu) in 2003. The disease
control policy of The Netherlands was in line with the stringent EU regulations for
the control of notifiable animal diseases at that time: a non-vaccination policy,2 and
in case of an outbreak, a stamping-out strategy. Animals that are either infected,
possibly infected or are a potential carrier of the disease, are culled in order to
prevent further spread of the disease. This strategy has raised a lot of public
concerns with a clear moral dimension. Questions as whether the control of
notifiable animal diseases justifies the killing of large numbers of animals, and
whether there are alternatives available for mass culling has been on the public
agenda ever since (cf. Cohen et al. 2007)
These questions can be addressed from different perspectives, such as the animal,
the perspective of food safety and public health, or the animal keeper. In this article,
we focus on one specific stakeholder: the keeper of backyard animals. Keepers of
backyard animals are a diverse, but substantial group in The Netherlands. An
estimated 400,000 citizens keep a few million animals and spend at least a few
billion euros on their hobby each year (Van Velzen and Dekker 2003; Treep et al.
2004; den Boer et al. 2004; Sijtsema et al. 2005). Their position is between the
professional animal keeper and the keeper of pets. On the one hand, backyard
animals are commonly not kept for commercial purposes. On the other hand and in
contrast to pet animals, these animals are not kept in the house. In a quantitative
study, performed as part of our research project, the main reasons for keeping
backyard animals are human-animal contact and breeding of fancy or rare breeds
rather than commercial purposes. They consider keeping animals as a way of living.
It is a hobby that is an intrinsic part of their life. This group of animal keepers
appears to be extremely critical in their assessment of the policy during the last
outbreaks. They argue that their interests and values are not taken seriously (cf.
Beekman et al. 2007).
In this article, we analyze the background and the implications of this criticism on
the animal disease policy.3 After having presented the harm principle as the obvious
justification that underlies recent policy measures, the shortcomings of this principle
in the context of animal disease prevention is discussed (see ‘‘The Harm Principle as
1 A notifiable animal disease is one that must be immediately reported to the authorities and includes all
animal diseases subject to national and/or international regulations.
2 In the subsequent years after the epidemics the Dutch government initiated a debate at the European
level to re-evaluate the non-vaccination policy. As a result vaccination-to-live is since 2006 allowed for
foot and mouth disease and avian influenza based on the EC directive 2006/14/EC.
3 The articles in the Special Issue of the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics on animal
diseases (vol 17 nr. 4–5, 2004) provide an interesting and helpful context for our discussion.
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a Problematic Justification of Animal Disease Policy’’). Rather than the prevention of
harm, the problematic aspect in animal disease prevention is the question how we
should weigh the conflicting ‘‘risks of harm’’ claims. With respect to conflicting
‘‘risks of harm,’’ the harm principle is silent on how to weigh competing claims of
‘‘risks of harm.’’ Therefore, governmental policy needs additional arguments in order
to weigh and prioritize different ‘‘risks of harm’’ (see ‘‘Risks, Conflicts, and the
Silence of the Harm Principle’’). The fact that governments all over Europe are able
to deal with diverging and sometimes conflicting ‘‘risks of harm’’ claims shows that,
next to the harm principle, additional assumptions are included in the policy and
legislation. Currently, these assumptions are veterinary and economic in nature.
Consequently, problems of animal disease prevention are addressed as mainly
veterinary and economic problems. The criticism of the keepers of backyard animals
is a clear indication of the shortcomings of this scope (Section The Criticism of
Keepers of Backyard Animals). Keepers of backyard animals do not feel wronged in
economic terms, but feel wronged in moral terms. They believe the infringement of
their lifestyle is justified on grounds with which they do not agree. Thus, what is
presented as a veterinary and economic problem turns out to be a question with a
clear moral dimension. Ignoring this moral dimension can only be at the cost of
leaving the values and interests of some groups out of consideration without
sufficient justification (Section The Central Role of Value Assumptions and the
Problem of an ‘‘Economy Only’’ Ciew).
The Harm Principle as a Problematic Justification of Animal Disease Policy
The current animal disease policy often has a serious impact on both animals and
animal keepers, such as the culling of animals and the restrictions of transportation.
This directly intervenes in the freedom of the individual animal keeper. Nonethe-
less, these measures are considered to be justified in that they aim to prevent society
from further harm, i.e., the spreading of the disease and the subsequent
consequences for food production, transport, and trade.
This justification seems to be based on the ‘‘harm to others’’ principle. The most
basic interpretation of the harm principle, as was introduced by Mill (1859/1979)
and further developed by many other authors (cf. Hart 1961; Feinberg 1984, 1994),
roughly states that governmental intervention is justified when it is aimed to prevent
harm to others. The principle starts from the ideal that every individual enjoys
maximum freedom that is still consistent with equal liberties of his fellow citizens.
Therefore, it is only justified to restrict the liberty of person A in order to prevent
that person from causing harm to person B, who can be a specific person, but also a
member of the public in general. Harming is in this context defined as a wrongful
setback of interests (Feinberg 1994, p. 4, 34). However, harm as such is not a
sufficient condition for evaluating the situation as morally impermissible. If it were
a sufficient condition, the moral claim that we ought not to impose harm on others
would have serious implications. In a very strict version the claim would imply that
broadly accepted practices, such as driving your car is problematic, because it
certainly is related to harm for many others. At this point, two additional elements
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are relevant: intentionality, and care. The harm principle is about harm that is
deliberately and intentionally imposed on others or that is the result of obvious
carelessness or negligence. The harm principle can justify strong interventions in
the freedom of, for instance, an animal keeper, who deliberately tries to harm others
by contributing to the spread of a disease. Furthermore, the harm principle can be
applied, if one is confronted with negligence. For example, it is assumed that the
outbreak of classical swine fever in The Netherlands in 1997 has been caused by a
lorry-driver that used to transport pigs in a region of Germany in which the virus for
classical swine fever was detected. His truck was not properly disinfected and as a
result millions of pigs had to be killed as part of the attempt to bring the disease
under control (Stegeman et al. 2000, p. 186). Although, the outbreak was not the
result of a deliberate choice to harm others, the involved person obviously has made
serious mistakes for which he can be accused.
However, in practice, only but very few agents in the animal sector really intend
to harm others. Furthermore, outbreaks also occur even if there is not a situation of
negligence. Out of perfectly decent, prima facie plausible motives some acts can
impose a serious risk of an outbreak. For instance, feeding cows with commercial
feed that contains bones and brains from animals was not done out of cruelty
towards the animals or with the intention to endanger animal health. Nonetheless, it
has been directly related to the outbreak of mad cow disease in the UK in the 1990s.
This illustrates that, in the practice of animal disease policy, a justification of the
government intervention by reference to the harm principle only is less straight-
forward. Only part of all current government interventions can be sufficiently
justified by this principle.
In answer to this, it can be argued that the harm principle can also be interpreted
in a less restricted way. Brink (2007), for instance, shows that the harm principle
also can be interpreted as: ‘‘A can restrict B’s liberty in order to prevent harm to
others’’ He distinguishes this, so-called HP2-version from the more restricted HP1-
version that states that: ‘‘A can restrict B’s liberty to prevent B from harming
others.’’ It is clear that HP1 only justifies intervention if ‘‘the target herself would be
the cause of harm to others.’’ HP2 also allows intervention in order to prevent harm
to others, ‘‘whether that harm would be caused by the target or in some other way.’’
In this case B need not intend to harm or even to be fully aware of the harm that may
result from his actions. This last version seems to be more in line with what is at
stake in animal disease policy. Reasons for intervention are not restricted to the fact
that animal keepers directly harm others, but government intervenes because their
actions may impose harm on others. It is a risk of harm. The BSE feed restrictions,
which were designed to reduce the spread of BSE, are a good example. The so-called
ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban implies the prohibition of the feeding of ruminant
animals, e.g., cattle, sheep, and goats, with animal proteins of mammalian origin.
The introduction of this prohibition entails an intervention in the freedom of several
actors in the animal food sector. Nevertheless, it is considered to be an issue that has
to be subject of governmental law and policy not because these actors directly harm
others if they feed their animals with animal proteins of mammalian origin, but
because it involves a risk of harm if animals that are herbivores by nature are fed
with feed from animal origin. Therefore, from the less restrictive interpretation of
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the harm principle, the government is allowed to introduce such compulsory
measures.
However, even this less restrictive interpretation of the harm principle is not
sufficient to justify all measures that are part of animal disease policy. Governments
often are confronted with a web of different, overlapping, but also conflicting claims
of harm, rather than with a clear distinction between the harmers and those who are
harmed. The tension between commercial actors in the livestock sector and keepers
of backyard animals can highlight this point. Both groups do not aim to harm each
other and they sincerely aim to prevent an outbreak of an animal disease.
Nonetheless, they differ with respect to the view on what risks of harm are
acceptable. For instance, commercial keepers may consider the presence of actors
who keep animals for reasons of hobby as a risk factor, because they are less
organized and operate in a less standardized way and thus the traceability of
possibly infected animals is low. Consequently, this way of animal keeping may
jeopardize the business security of the commercial animal keeper. On the other
hand, keepers of backyard animals do not consider this assumed risk of harm for the
commercial sector a sufficient justification for a restriction in their freedom of
lifestyle. They are convinced that their animals are not the cause of disease
outbreaks, and do not contribute to a further spread of the disease. A recent study on
the avian influenza virus in The Netherlands in 2003 substantiates their conviction
(Bavinck et al. 2009). They even may claim that these commercial keepers and their
focus on trade and export are a risk to their idea of the good life and their way of
caring for their animals.
In such cases, the problem is not that one partner will be harmed by another if the
government does not intervene, but that both partners anticipate running a risk to be
harmed by each other, and ask for government intervention. In order to deal with
such problems, the government needs tools to weigh and assess conflicting claims of
harm and to cope with the risk element of harm. These are tools that the harm
principle cannot provide.
Risks, Conflicts, and the Silence of the Harm Principle
Given the fact that European governments are confronted with conflicting claims of
stakeholders who anticipate running a risk to be harmed by each other, and who ask
for government intervention, a justification of government intervention based on the
harm principle only becomes complicated. The conflicting claims and the aspect of
risk complicate the government’s decision to choose the option that preserves the
most freedom.
First, the conflicting claims of stakeholders illustrate that governments have to
deal with various kinds and amounts of harm. Confronted with conflicts of
legitimate claims, the government has a serious priority problem. They have to
compare and evaluate the different claims in order to be able to intervene and
prevent. This implies a process of assessing ‘‘the types of harm, the amounts of
harm, and our willingness, as a society, to bear the harms.’’ (Harcourt 1999, p. 182)
In this process the harm principle does not provide much guidance. Even stronger,
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‘‘the harm principle is silent on those questions.’’ (Harcourt 1999, p. 182) The
principle only shows that doing harm is morally not permissible and that an
infringement of personal liberty is allowed in order to prevent harm. The principle,
however, does not provide a tool to compare and value conflicting risks of harm nor
does it indicate which of the conflicting risks of harm should prevail. To make such
a comparison and to decide how to address the conflict, one needs additional
arguments.
Second, the aspect of risk illustrates that policies have to deal with the probability
that a specific action or type of action results in a harm. The policy is not only about
limiting harm, but also about reducing the risk that harm will occur. This is
especially relevant, because the policies are not merely focused on the control
during an outbreak. Governments also formulate strategies for the prevention of
notifiable animal diseases. In those cases, the element of probability plays an even
more central role than during an outbreak. This implies that governments do not
only have to assess the various types of risk, but also have to assess the risk that
harm will occur because of a specific action or practice. In these situations,
reference to the harm principle only is not enough to justify government
intervention. On the one hand, weighing ‘‘risks of harm’’ confronts policy makers
with the aspect of uncertainty. More then once, there is no clear risk, but only a
certain probability on certain harm related to a particular action. Simply ignoring or
silencing the uncertainty is often no option as the case of the control of BSE or
‘‘Mad cow disease’’ in the UK illustrates. Since 1986, BSE is known as a fatal
neurodegenerative disease that affects cattle, but it was only in 1996 that the UK
government announced that BSE was linked to a novel human disease that is fatal
for humans: the variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). Moreover, this disease
appeared to be almost certainly caused by consuming BSE-contaminated food. The
governmental authorities, however, first were silent about the uncertainty and
assured the public that no safety issues were involved in the consumption of beef
and that all BSE-related health issues were fully under control. However, at some
point the government had to announce that beef consumption could have serious
adverse health effects and that they had already known this for some time but had
not conveyed the uncertainty they faced. It appeared that the authorities had been
erroneously taken the ‘‘absence of evidence’’ as ‘‘evidence of absence.’’ (Mepham
2004, p. 331) As a consequence, the UK-government has been severely criticized
(House of Lords 2000). This criticism is not so much based upon the knowledge that
becomes available after the crisis, but on the way the government ignored dealing
with and communicate on the uncertainty they were faced with. Confronted with
uncertainty, it is possible to determine what action is preferable, given the available
evidence. In these situations extra moral tools, such as the precautionary principle
can guide one’s decisions.
On the other hand, dealing with the aspect of risk in the claims of stakeholders is
more than mere risk calculation. Risk (R) can be defined as the probability (P) of the
occurrence of a hazard (h): R = P 9 h. Therefore, a probability of 0.0001 on the
occurrence of a hazard that has a seriousness of 100 leads to the same result as if we
are confronted with a hazard with a seriousness of 0.1 and a probability of 0.1.
However, if the 100-unit hazard implies the death of a whole city and the 0.1-unit
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hazard some extra noise for all citizens of that city, because of a train passing by
every 30 min, then the risks are differently valued and the risk of the death of a whole
city needs stronger justification than the risk of more noise. Although the calculation
results in the same figures, the example illustrates that identifying hazards as risks
and the assessment of those risks are not the result of pure and value-free calculation
(Jensen and Sandøe 2002; Rasmussen and Jensen 2005). Every identification of a
hazard as a risk is based upon value-laden assumptions, and moral decisions always
(implicitly) play a role in the weighing of risks. This is no different with respect to the
control of animal diseases (cf. Anthony 2004; Jensen 2004). In this process the harm
principle can be action guiding, because it says to choose that option that preserve
most freedom. However, it cannot be the only tool, because of the above-mentioned
silence on how to evaluate and weigh different types and amounts of harm. For
instance, in their study on the avian influenza virus in The Netherlands in 2003,
Bavinck et al. (2009) conclude that ‘‘the probability of infection is much smaller for
hobby flocks than for commercial farms,’’ but at the same time that ‘‘as birds are kept
outdoors, backyard flocks may be more at risk for introductions of AI strains (…).’’
They argue that this can be explained, because ‘‘the probability of infection is most
likely determined by a complex combination of determinants as the number of
animals, the type of species or breeds present, the number and type of contacts
between flocks, and the sanitary measures that are put in place.’’ (pp. 252–253).
To decide in such a context, a government needs in addition to the harm
principle, value-laden assumptions to deal with both the conflicts and with the risk
element of the claims of harm. Only these value assumptions can help to determine
what risk of harm should be addressed, even if it is at the cost of leaving another risk
unaddressed. For example, if public health is highly valued, one can argue that
addressing risks of harm with respect to human health should always prevail over
risks of other kinds of harm. Only based on such additional value-laden assumptions
it is possible to evaluate the risk aspect of harm and to make choices between
conflicting claims of harm. Given this claim, it appears that governments all over
Europe make such evaluations and have specific value assumptions. In spite of the
shortcomings of the harm principle, they are able to deal with the conflicting risks of
harm related to animal disease prevention. This leads us to the conclusion that a
focus on these basic assumptions is necessary to understand the criticism of the
keepers of backyard animals on the animal disease policy. Before going into the
details of the currently used value assumptions, we shortly focus on the criticism
from the keepers of backyard animals on the animal disease policy.
The Criticism of Keepers of Backyard Animals
Keepers of backyard animals are no strict opponents of animal disease policy.
However, most of them were very critical of the policy and interventions during the
last outbreaks, especially of the lack of differentiation between the different groups
of animal keepers (cf. Beekman et al. 2007; Treep et al. 2004). A short analysis of
their problems with the methods of prevention and control at the time of the
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outbreaks is helpful in illustrating the shortcomings of the harm principle and in
explicating the additional value-lade assumptions used in the current policies.
First, keepers of backyard animals believe they have been wronged by the current
policy measures. They consider their hobby as a predominantly private affair
(Sijtsema et al. 2005), with its own internal values. The reason to keep animals is
part of their idea of the good life. It is not just a hobby; it is part of their lifestyle and
an essential element of who they are and what they consider worthwhile in life. In
other words, keeping animals is important to their identity. Therefore, policy
measures that entail the risk of the culling of animals do not only jeopardize the
lives of the animals themselves, or the interests of a certain animal practice, but are
considered a serious infringement of one’s way of life. They believe that animal
disease policy directly interferes with one of their most important freedoms, i.e., to
choose one’s own life plan that fits one’s identity. Apparently, the government
evaluated this infringement of freedom as less important than the harm to the public
at stake, but this evaluation does not directly follow from the harm principle.
Second, keepers of backyard animals also believe they have been wronged,
because they believe that the current policy underestimates the public goods related
to their way of keeping animals. They consider the policy measures to signal
disrespect with regard to public interests that are promoted by keeping animals for
reasons of hobby. It is emphasized that the keeping of animals for recreational
purposes results in goods of which its value goes beyond the private level. For
instance, the breeding of rare or endangered species is considered as such a good.
Also those forms of amateur livestock keeping that represents a type of rural life
that has almost disappeared as a result of processes such as the systematic increase
of scale in agriculture, urbanization, and industrialization, contribute to goods that
are highly valued by the public. Nonetheless, these public goods were, up until
recently, not enough reason to provide the keepers of backyard animals a more
protected position in the policy. Again, this illustrates the use of additional
assumptions next to the harm principle.
Third, these animal keepers claim that the current regulation is far too stringent
or even disproportionate, because they believe that they play no role in the outbreak.
Fourth, keepers of backyard animals argue that they are forced to take measures
that they do not only consider as too stringent, but also morally unacceptable. For
instance, they experience the obligation to keep the animals inside under very harsh
restriction as too stringent, but also as morally problematic given the animal welfare
consequences.
On top of this, the culling of healthy animals is considered as morally
unacceptable. The moral concerns did not only cover moral unease with the killing
of animals as such. They believe that perfectly healthy animals are killed
purposelessly4 and that they were forced to act in a morally objectionable way that
leaves them with the idea that they betrayed their animals.5 At the last two points,
4 Note that the evaluation of the killing as purposeless is the result of a different evaluation of the risks
involved with the other options for action.
5 This is based upon the results of 24 in-depth interviews that have been held with representatives of
organizations for keepers of backyard animals by Cohen as part of the research project ‘‘New foundations
for prevention and control of notifiable animal diseases.’’
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the additional moral assumptions become most explicit. The problem is not a
discussion on the rightful interpretation of the harm principle, but on arguments and
values that are used to assess the harms at stake and to evaluate ‘‘our willingness, as
a society, to bear the harms.’’
In summary, keepers of backyard animals consider themselves to have been
wronged not because they do not agree with the importance of the harm principle,
but because they do not agree with the way the possible harms are valued, how the
risk element of harm is assessed, and how the conflicts of harms are addressed. It is
clear that the criticism of keepers of backyard animals on governmental intervention
is not on the harm principle as such. It is much more the result of people’s feeling of
being wronged by the intervention, because they do not share the underlying moral
assumptions and evaluations that result in addressing some risk of harm, while
leaving others unaddressed. More in general, keepers of backyard animals do not
feel to be taken seriously as stakeholders with interests that are worthwhile
protecting and with animals with which they have a special relationship. To
understand this criticism, we have to focus on the value assumptions that underlie
the current policy.
The Central Role of Value Assumptions and the Problem of an ‘‘Economy
Only’’ View
The justification of the government intervention as part of animal disease policy
often implicitly includes a trade off of freedom against other values. In practice,
especially economic and veterinary considerations play a crucial role. This bias can
easily be understood by the history of animal husbandry in Europe, which has been
developed to ensure ‘‘food security,’’ i.e., to secure the production of safe food for
all, policy, market structures, and technologies aim to increase food production and
facilitate free trade. Consequently, this focus can be recognized in the animal
disease policies too. There is a clear tendency to assess animal diseases and its
consequences in economic terms only. For instance, the decision of the European
Union to adopt the former non-vaccination policy was informed by veterinarian
arguments, but mainly justified on economic grounds. It was calculated that the
economic costs of preventive vaccination were higher than the costs involved with
controlling an epidemic. Furthermore, it was argued that a non-vaccination policy
stimulates free market trade of animal products between countries, who have
adopted this policy (cf. KNAW/Royal Academy of Sciences 2002). This illustrates
that the animal disease policy has been mainly focused on economic trade and has
evaluated the value of goods merely in terms of its economic benefits.
The current economy-based policies (cf. Dijkhuizen and Morris 1997), however,
have become subject to serious criticism. On economic arguments, it has been
stressed that it is highly questionable whether this policy strategy is the most cost
efficient. For instance, the outbreak of classical swine fever in 1997 was extremely
costly for all involved partners. The Dutch government had to compensate farmers,
but in spite of the compensation the farmers were financially harmed, and the
national and international reputation of the Dutch pig farmers was negatively
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affected. This illustrates that in the long run, it is not so certain whether this policy is
sound in economic terms. Another example is the criticism of the calculations that
underlie the stamping-out strategy during the 2001-foot and mouth disease. This has
been criticized, because the policy turned out to have a serious impact on the tourist
industry too. This was not part of the original risk-benefit calculation. A similar
claim can be made with respect to the socio-psychological damages to the involved
stakeholders entailed by the stamping-out policy that have been ignored in the
calculation. On top of this, the recent outbreaks provided a lot of relevant epidemic
knowledge that shows some risk calculation to be flawed and some measures to be
less relevant than they were expected to be.
Nonetheless, the most profound problems are with the economy-based approach
itself. The criticism of keepers of backyard animals signals three broader problems
with this approach. First, it illustrates a too limited view of whose interests have to
be taken into consideration and who should be seen as a stakeholder who may run a
risk of harm as a result of policy intervention. The emphasis on trade and export
entails that stakeholder interests are only valued and taken into account as far as
they can be assessed within an economic framework. The interests of stakeholders
that do not easily fit within this framework are often left out of consideration or only
play a marginal role. As a result, the role that non-commercial animal keepers play
is very modest. From the perspective of trade, their interests and claims are often
subservient to those of the livestock sector that trade and export animals and animal
products.
A second point of criticism concerns the overall aim that underlies the evaluation
of harm as a legitimate reason for state intervention. Although all agents are
considered to be entitled to be protected by the government against harm, what
counts as harm is evaluated from the aim to stimulate free market trade of animal
products between countries. As a result, the issues that do not easily fit within an
economic framework tend to be left out of consideration in the translation of risks of
harm into an economical risk-benefit analysis. For instance, the fact that keeping
animals is important to the identity of keepers of backyard animals is difficult to
translate into economic sound language or in terms of a contribution to free trade.
Consequently, an economy-based approach hardly can deal with the importance of
this lifestyle aspect. This is problematic, because the infringement of a person’s way
of life needs a justification other than the argument that it does not fit in an
economic framework. Meaningful actions and views on the good life of citizens
who keep animals for reasons of hobby are regulated in a way that is unacceptable
for them, because the decisions are based upon economical considerations that they
do not share and that do not reckon adequately with the lifestyle element that is
violated. This problem also holds for the above-mentioned public interests that are
related to keeping backyard animals for reasons of the breeding of rare breeds or
endangered species. Not all of these goods may contribute to food production or to
export, but they have public value.
Third, the economy-based approach can deal with only a limited number of views
of the animal and the human-animal relationship. The animal is mainly conceived as
a commodity. Consequently, the relationship between human and animal are
primarily defined in terms of commodity and owner. From this perspective, the
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animal has a value as far as it is, or can become part of export and trade.
Consequently, policy measures that entail the risk of the culling of animals are
acceptable if it guarantees future trade. This view is problematic. On the one hand,
because empirical research has shown that the public no longer considers arguments
based on economic benefit and export only sufficient to justify the culling of healthy
animals or to cause very severe animal welfare problems (Treep et al. 2004, p. 55ff;
Noordhuizen-Stassen et al. 2003, pp. 43–44). Animals are now commonly
conceived as subjects whose value cannot be reduced to their economical worth.
On the other hand, the idea of the human-animal relationship as an owner-
commodity relationship does not fit with the relationship keepers of backyard
animals have with their animals. They value their animals and the relation with
them fundamentally differently. They are owners of the animal, but do not value the
animals for financial reasons only. Consequently, the government justifies the
culling of animals and other preventive measures on grounds they do not share.
These three problems of a strong emphasis on economic considerations in dealing
with conflicting risks of harm show that this strategy may be effective, in the sense
that it results in priority rules that one needs to apply the harm principle. However, it
disregards the plurality of values and norms in society. It is effective only because it
forces us to discuss issues of animal disease control and prevention as merely
economic and veterinary problems, while the main problem of those who criticize
the policy starts in a moral disagreement about how non-economic considerations
should be valued.
Conclusion
In this article, we first have shown that the current problem of animal disease policy
cannot be reduced to a problem of the rightful interpretation of the harm principle.
The control of animal disease is a matter of dealing with conflicting claims of ‘‘risks
of harm’’ that requires an assessment of the types of harm and the probability that a
harm may occur. In this process the harm principle is of less guidance. Additional
assumptions are needed in order to justify government interventions.
Second, we have argued that these additional assumptions cannot be reduced to
economic terms. It requires an interdisciplinary interaction of science, ethics, and
society. This is the lesson that can be learned from the criticism of the keepers of
backyard animals. Apparently, the disapproval may seem as the opinion of just a
minority group. The above analysis, however, shows that their criticism is linked to
a discussion with strong connections to non-economic beliefs and values. The
problem is a moral one. The basic assumptions that underlie the preventive
measures are not shared by the keepers of backyard animals. If one aims to develop
a sustainable animal disease policy, this implies that conflicting claims with respect
to risks of harm cannot be settled by translating all claims into economic or even
monetary terms. As long as not all stakeholders agree on the moral importance and
value of the economy, forcing us to discuss the problems in financial terms does not
settle the real problem. Only if the moral assumptions of the current policy are
Beyond the Prevention of Harm 569
123
explicated and the scope of what counts as relevant for animal disease control is
broadened can a more robust animal disease policy be developed.
Therefore, the moral values and principles of all involved have to be taken
seriously. Ignoring this moral dimension can only be at the cost of leaving the
values and interests of some groups out of consideration without sufficient
justification.
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